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0R¶ esum¶ e:
Ce papier contribue µ a la th¶ eorie \search" du ch^ omage par la g¶ en¶ eration endogµ ene de fonctions
d'appariement pour des travailleurs quali¯¶ es et non-quali¯¶ es dans un jeu d'a±chage de salaire.
Le modµ ele est capable de produire une prime de quali¯cation positive ainsi qu'un di®¶ erentiel de
salaire positif entre les travailleurs homogµ enes non quali¯¶ es. La prime de quali¯cation appara^ ³t
en raison d'une technologie biais¶ ee par les quali¯cations; le di®¶ erentiel de salaire parmi les tra-
vailleurs non quali¯¶ es trouve son origine dans un salaire plus faible compens¶ e par une plus forte
probabilit¶ e d'obtenir l'emploi. Le modµ ele o®re des explications utiles pour l'¶ evolution observ¶ ee
des di®¶ erentiels de salaire µ a l'int¶ erieur des classes de quali¯cations et entre elles durant les ann¶ ees
1970 et 1980 ainsi que pour la variabilit¶ e relative des heures de travail des di®¶ erents groupes µ a
travers le cycle.
Abstract:
This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously generating match-
ing functions for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. The model is capable of
producing a positive skill premium and a positive wage di®erential among homogeneous unskilled
workers. The skill premium arises from a skill-biased technology; the wage di®erential among
unskilled workers sustains because a lower wage is compensated by a higher chance of getting the
job. The model provides useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill
and between-skill wage di®erentials in the 1970s and 1980s and for the relative cyclical volatility
of hours of work by di®erent skill groups of workers.
JEL classi¯cations: C78, J31, J64.
Keywords: Wage-posting; Wage di®erentials; Skill-biased technology.
11 Introduction
The U.S. data show a number of interesting regularities of unskilled workers. First, there is
sizable wage inequality within unskilled workers. The log weekly wage di®erential between the
50th percentile and the 10th percentile of workers in the U.S. was about 0:57 between 1964 and
1988, two thirds of which cannot be explained by skill or age/experience di®erences (Juhn et al.,
1993, Table 2).1 Second, the dynamic pattern of the wage di®erential within unskilled workers
was in contrast with that of the education premium. While the education premium fell during
the 1970s and then rose sharply in the 1980s, the within-group wage di®erential (unobserved skill
price) rose rather steadily in both the 1970s and the 1980s (see Figure 1, reproduced from Juhn
et al., 1993, p432). Third, over business cycles, hours of work by low-wage earners are much more
volatile than those by high-wage earners, although both are procyclical (Rios-Rull, 1993).
These regularities jointly present a serious challenge for economic modelling. Theories that
are capable of generating within-group wage di®erentials, such as Montgomery (1991) and Lang
(1991), do not pay particular attention to the joint behavior of the within-group wage di®erential
and the skill premium. Theories that are capable of explaining the sharply rising skill premium,
such as Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Violante (1996), rely excessively on match-speci¯c
productivity as an explanation for the within-group wage di®erential. Although skilled workers'
productivity might indeed have a large match-speci¯c component, it is unlikely that unskilled
workers' productivity depends much on matches. Both theories have ignored the implications
of wage di®erentials on cyclical movements of hours of work. These cyclical movements are the
focus of Rios-Rull (1993), but the wage inequality in his model can be attributed to workers' age
and skill di®erences and hence does not explain the large within-group wage di®erential.
In this paper I construct a model that is useful for explaining the above facts. There is a large
labor market where ¯rms di®er in the technologies that they use (high or low) and workers di®er
in skills (skilled or unskilled). Skills are observable and complementary with the high technology
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Figure 1: Skill price indexes for men, 1963-89 (1963/64 = 100)
3in the sense that skilled workers' productivity is higher with the high technology than with the low
technology. There is a search cost, implicit in the assumption that in any given period a worker
can get at most one o®er. Firms post wages to attract applicants and workers decide which job
to apply to after observing the posted wages. These strategic interactions endogenously generate
wages and matching functions for the two types of workers.
To focus on unskilled workers, I abstract from match-speci¯c productivity and set up the
model deliberately so that skilled workers all get the same wage and work only in the high-
technology industry. They earn a higher wage than do unskilled workers (i.e., a skill premium).
Unskilled workers work in both industries and there is a positive wage di®erential among these
homogeneous workers. An unskilled worker in a high-technology ¯rm gets a higher wage than an
identical worker in a low-technology ¯rm. In contrast to some existing theories, this within-group
wage di®erential arises not because unskilled workers are more productive in the high-technology
industry than in the low-technology industry, nor because they are complementary with skilled
workers in production, but rather because the higher wage is a necessary compensation for the
lower chance of getting a high-technology job than getting a low-technology job by unskilled
workers.
With numerical exercises I compute the responses of the wage di®erentials and employment
levels of di®erent skill groups to unanticipated shocks. A skill-biased productivity increase gener-
ates a large increase in the skill premium and a moderate increase in the wage di®erential within
unskilled workers. An increase in the general productivity of all workers also increases the skill
premium but reduces the wage di®erential within unskilled workers. These results indicate that
skill-biased technological progress is a valuable explanation for the wage di®erential patterns in
the 1980s. They also point to a general productivity slowdown as the explanation for the oppo-
site movements in the 1970s between the skill premium and the within-group wage di®erential.
Finally, consistent with the cyclical behavior of hours of work, unskilled workers' hours of work
increase by more than do skilled workers' hours of work when the general productivity increases
4and decrease by more when the general productivity decreases.
The main feature of the wage-posting model, shared with Peters (1991), Montgomery (1991)
and Moen (1997), is that market participants make a trade-o® between prices (wages) and the
associated probabilities, which arises endogenously from agents' strategic plays in a large uncoor-
dinated labor market. This trade-o® seems realistic but is typically absent in the large literature
on price/wage search, where workers discover a ¯rm's o®ered wage only after visiting the ¯rm
(see Rothschild and McMillan, 1994, for a survey).2
The main theoretical contribution of this paper is to generate matching functions for di®erent
skill groups from the wage-posting game. In addition to the immediate use of discussing the above
facts on unskilled workers, these matching functions can be useful in general for the search theory
of unemployment, which has assumed exogenous aggregate matching functions (Mortensen, 1982,
and Pissarides, 1990).3 The endogenous matching functions also help to reconcile wage-posting
models with the paradoxical ¯nding by Holzer et al. (1991) that jobs paying more than the
minimum wage attract fewer applicants than do minimum wage jobs. In the current model it is
possible for a worker in a short queue to obtain a higher wage than another identical worker in
a long queue, provided that there are more workers in the short queue whose skills are above the
reference worker's than in the long queue.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the labor market. Section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibrium in the limit economy where the numbers of workers and ¯rms approach
in¯nity. Section 4 establishes di®erences in wages and matching rates among workers. Section
5 examines equilibrium responses to shocks and discusses the empirical facts. Section 6 extends
the model. Section 7 concludes the paper and the appendix provides necessary proofs.
2This trade-o® was ¯rst analyzed by Harris and Todaro (1970) in the development literature and then by Carlton
(1978) in price theory. In the Harris-Todaro model the wage di®erence between sectors is exogenously assumed
and agents only migrate slowly between sectors. The current paper endogenously generates such a wage di®erential
from agents' strategic plays and shows that it sustains when ¯rms can instantaneously switch between industries.
The strategic analysis also contrasts with Carlton's analysis which exogenously assumes that agents' preferences
have a smooth ordering over pairs of prices and service probabilities.
3For example, the search theory has di±culty to explain simultaneously the observed average duration of unem-
ployment and cyclical patterns of job creation and destruction (Cole and Rogerson, forthcoming). The di®erential
matching functions in this paper might help the performance by allowing skilled and unskilled workers to have
di®erent lengths of unemployment duration and di®erent responses to technological shocks.
52 The Labor Market
Consider a labor market with N workers and M ¯rms, where N and M are both large numbers.
Let n ´ N=M be the worker/¯rm ratio. A fraction s of the workers are skilled and denoted
with a subscript s; the remaining fraction are unskilled and denoted with a subscript u. Skills
are perfectly observable. A fraction H of the ¯rms use a high technology and are denoted with
a subscript H; the remaining fraction of ¯rms use a low technology and are denoted with a
subscript L. Without loss of generality, let us assume that sN, (1 ¡ s)N, MH and M(1 ¡ H)
are all integers. Workers and ¯rms are both risk neutral. Workers (¯rms) within each type are
identical. Each ¯rm wants to hire one and only one worker.
Output depends on skill and technology as follows. An unskilled worker produces y units of
output regardless of the technology used (but see Section 6.2). A skilled worker produces µy units
of goods with the high technology and y units of goods with the low technology, where µ > 1.
Thus, skill and the high technology are complementary. µ is termed the skill-biased productivity
and y is termed the general productivity.
The numbers N and H are determined endogenously in equilibrium by ¯rms' entry, but s is
¯xed for simplicity (see Section 6.1 for a discussion). The ¯xed cost of entry is KL for the low-
technology industry and KH for the high-technology industry, with KH > KL. The productivity
advantage of the high-technology is assumed to be su±cient to cover the higher entry cost:
Assumption 1 µ > KH=KL.
The matching process between ¯rms and workers is time-consuming. This matching cost is
captured here in the simplest way by assuming that each worker can apply to at most one ¯rm
in a period (although mixed strategies are allowed). To simplify, I restrict the time horizon to
one period and argue in Section 6.3 that most of the results are also valid for a dynamic setting.
Firms and workers do not passively wait for matches dictated by an exogenous matching
function as in Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990). Instead, ¯rms post wages to attract
workers and workers observe the announced wages before applying. The strategic interactions
6between ¯rms and workers endogenously generate both the matching function and the split of
the match surplus between ¯rms and workers.4 There is no coordination among ¯rms or workers.
Some ¯rms may fail to get any applicant while other ¯rms may have more applicants than they
can possibly hire, leaving some workers unemployed.
Given the large numbers of workers and ¯rms, it is natural to focus on symmetric equilibria
where ex ante identical ¯rms or workers use the same strategy. Since skilled and unskilled workers
have the same productivity ina low-technology ¯rm, such a ¯rm announces the same wage for both
types of workers, denoted wL. A high-technology ¯rm announces a wage wHu for unskilled workers
and wHs for skilled workers. Denote wH = (wHs;wHu). The wages in the economy are W ´
(wH;¢¢¢;wH;wL;¢¢¢;wL). Observing the wages, each unskilled worker's application strategy is
Pu ´ (pHu;¢¢¢;pHu;pLu;¢¢¢;pLu), where pju is the probability that he applies to each ¯rm in
industry j (j = H;L). Similarly, a skilled worker's strategy is Ps ´ (pHs;¢¢¢;pHs;pLs;¢¢¢;pLs).
These probabilities depend on the posted wages and so Ps = Ps(W) and Pu = Pu(W). They
must add up properly:
MH ¢ pHu + M(1 ¡ H) ¢ pLu = 1; (1)
MH ¢ pHs +M(1 ¡H) ¢pLs = 1: (2)
After workers have carried out their strategies, each ¯rm that has received at least one appli-
cant chooses one worker from its applicants (described below) to start production immediately.
Then output is sold, the worker is paid the speci¯ed wage, and the game ends.
A low-technology ¯rm is indi®erent between all applicants. If the ¯rm received k (¸ 1)
applicants, each applicant gets the job with probability 1=k. In contrast, a high-technology ¯rm
strictly prefers skilled applicants. Indeed, Section 3 shows that
µy ¡ wHs > y ¡wHu: (3)
That is, for a high-technology ¯rm the ex post gain from hiring a skilled worker is higher than from
4One can assume instead that each worker observes only two independently drawn wages (see Acemoglu and
Shimer, 1997) or that ¯rms announce only reserve wages and hold auctions after receiving applicants (see Julien et
al., 1998). These alternative formulations complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative results much.
7hiring an unskilled worker. If the ¯rm has received both skilled and unskilled applicants, only
skilled applicants are considered and one of them is chosen (with equal probability). Unskilled
applicants are considered only when the ¯rm receives no skilled applicant, in which case the ¯rm
chooses one from the unskilled applicants it received with equal probability.
Condition (3) holds for the following reason. When the skill-biased productivity is high, as
in Assumption 1, each high-technology ¯rm tries to attract skilled workers. A wage wHs that
reverses the strict inequality in (3), although possibly very high, is not attractive to skilled workers
because then the ¯rm's ex post incentive is to prefer unskilled workers. A wage wHs that changes
(3) into an equality makes the ¯rm ex post indi®erent between skilled and unskilled workers. But,
in this case posting a marginally lower wHs would give skilled applicants a priority over unskilled
applicants in the line of selection and would make the job much more attractive than before to
skilled applicants. Therefore, the best way for a high-technology ¯rm to attract skilled workers
is to announce wages that satisfy (3).
Workers make a trade-o® between the wage and the probability of obtaining it. Let qjs be
the probability with which a skilled worker gets the job he applies to in industry j (= H;L).




(1 ¡Áp1)a1(1 ¡ Áp2)a2dÁ: (4)
Lemma 1 The probabilities q's are:
qLs = f(pLs;pLu;sN ¡ 1;(1 ¡ s)N); (5)
qHs = f(pHs;0;sN ¡1;(1¡ s)N); (6)
qLu = f(pLs;pLu;sN;(1 ¡s)N ¡1); (7)
qHu = (1 ¡pHs)sN ¢ f(0;pHu;sN;(1¡ s)N ¡ 1): (8)
Moreover, qHs > qHu, provided NpHs and NpHu are bounded above zero. Thus, when N;M ! 1,
there cannot be an equilibrium with wHs ¸ wHu if pHs;pHu;pLs;pLu all lie in (0;1).
8Lemma 1 (proved in Appendix A) states that a skilled worker has a better chance of getting a
job from a high-technology ¯rm than does an unskilled worker, which is intuitive because of the
skill-biased productivity. The additional term (1¡pHs)sN in the formula of pHu is the probability
that a high-technology ¯rm to which an unskilled worker applies has received no skilled applicant,
only in which case is the unskilled worker considered by the ¯rm.
Lemma 1 also states that, if both types of workers mix in both industries, a skilled worker's
wage in a high-technology ¯rm must be lower than an unskilled worker's when the market gets
large. To explain, note that the relative expected wage between skilled and unskilled workers must
be the same in the two industries when both types of workers are indi®erent between the two
industries. In the low-technology industry, the relative expected wage between the two types of
workers approaches unity when the numbers of ¯rms and workers are su±ciently large, since the
two types of workers are paid the same wage and in the limit have the same chance of getting
the job there. Thus, in the high-technology industry the relative expected wage between the two
types of workers must also approach unity. This is possible only when unskilled workers get a
higher wage in the high-technology industry than do skilled workers, because unskilled workers
have an inferior chance of getting a job there (even in the limit).
In reality skills command a premium, which can be generated in the current framework if
skilled workers strictly prefer high-technology jobs, i.e., if pLs = 0, which will be the equilibrium
analyzed in this paper. In this case, a high-technology ¯rm can and will o®er such wages that
attract unskilled workers as well as skilled workers: Attracting only skilled workers would leave a
high-technology ¯rm empty-handed when no skill applicant shows up. This is stated below (The
proof, presented in Appendix B, can be understood better after reading Section 3):
Lemma 2 If pLs = 0, then pHu > 0 for su±ciently large N and M.
It is easy to see that an equilibrium cannot be such that all workers apply only to the high-
technology industry. Thus, pLu > 0. I can simplify the notation pHs to ps, wHs to ws and qHs to
9qs. With pLs = 0, the probabilities q's can be explicitly computed as:
qs =
1¡(1¡pHs)sN
sNpHs ; qLu =
1¡(1¡pLu)(1¡s)N
(1¡s)NpLu ;







Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that equilibrium characterization is considerably simpler in the
limit case N;M ! 1 than in the ¯nite case. In the ¯nite case a single ¯rm's decision a®ects the
probability that workers apply to other ¯rms, a®ects the probability that workers are chosen by
other ¯rms and so changes workers' expected payo®s from applying to other ¯rms. This e®ect
disappears when there are in¯nitely many ¯rms and workers.
3 The Limit Equilibrium
3.1 Queue Lengths and Workers' Strategies
Now let N;M ! 1 but let the worker/¯rm ratio remain at n 2 (0;1) and H lie in the interior
of (0;1). In this limit each ¯rm's decision has no e®ect on workers' expected payo® from other
¯rms.5 Let Uu be the expected utility that an unskilled worker gets in the market and Us be the
expected utility for a skilled worker. With the above quali¯cation, Us and Uu are taken as given
by individual ¯rms and are determined in equilibrium later. Note that a skilled worker has the
option to apply to a low-technology ¯rm, which yields an expected utility Uu. Since they strictly
prefer applying to high-technology jobs, Us > Uu.
In the limit, the probabilities ps, pHu and pLu all approach zero but Nps, NpHu and NpLu
are ¯nite and strictly positive. Since it is the latter which enter the calculation of ¯rms' expected
pro¯ts and worker's expected wages, it is convenient to use the queue length { the expected
number of workers applying to a ¯rm { in lieu of the probabilities. Let xs be the queue length
of skilled workers applying to a high-technology ¯rm and xju be the queue length of unskilled
5In related environments Burdett et al. (1996) and Peters (1998) show that the equilibrium with this restriction
is indeed the limit of the equilibrium in the ¯nite economy without this restriction. A proof for the current
environment can be found in http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/shi/wskill3.PDF
10workers applying to a ¯rm in industry j (= H;L). Then,6
xs = sNps; xHu = (1 ¡s)NpHu; xLu = (1 ¡s)NpLu: (10)
Since the x'es are simply the p'es rescaled, Iwill refer toXs ´ (xs;¢¢¢) as a skilledworker's strategy
and Xu ´ (xHu;¢¢¢;xLu;¢¢¢) as an unskilled worker's strategy, although the X'es are outcomes
of aggregating workers' strategies. The adding-up constraints (1) and (2) can be rewritten as:
xs = ns=H; (11)
HxHu + (1 ¡ H)xLu = n(1 ¡s): (12)
Each worker also gets the job he applies to with a strictly positive probability. Since (1 ¡
p)sN ! e¡sNp, taking the limit N;M ! 1 on (9) yields:




The function g(¢) de¯ned above is smooth and strictly decreasing. Also, g(¢) is strictly convex,
with g(0) = 1 and g(1) = 0.
3.2 Firms' Wage Posting Decisions
A ¯rm's wage decision can be expressed as a trade-o® between the wage w and the probability of
a match, which enters through the queue length x. A ¯rm must increase the wage rate in order to
increase the chance of a match. To ¯nd the equilibrium trade-o®, let us ¯rst consider a deviation
by a single low-technology ¯rm from wL to wd
L, while all other ¯rms announce the same wages
as before. For convenience, number the deviator as the ¯rst low-technology ¯rm. The new wages
are Wd = (wH;¢¢¢;wd
L;wL;¢¢¢). The deviation does not change a skilled worker's strategy: It

















11high-technology ¯rm. That is, skilled workers continue to apply only to high-technology ¯rms
and so xs does not change.
Unskilled workers respond to the deviation. Each unskilled worker revises the probability
of applying to the deviator from pLu to pd
Lu, which results in a queue length xd
Lu, where xd
Lu is
de¯ned as in (10) with pd
Lu replacing pLu. With large (in¯nite) numbers of ¯rms and workers, the
deviation has a negligible e®ect on the queue lengths of unskilled workers for other ¯rms, xHu
and xLu. Thus, an unskilled worker's strategy is Xd
u = (xHu;¢¢¢;xd
Lu;xLu;¢¢¢).
The deviation must leave an unskilled worker indi®erent between the deviating ¯rm and other
¯rms, i.e., g(xd
Lu)wd








Since g(x) is a decreasing function, the indi®erence curve INDLu(¢;Uu) is upward sloping:
A higher wage must be accompanied with a longer queue in order to make applicants indif-
ferent between the deviator and a non-deviator. Also, INDLu(x;Uu) is convex in x, with
INDLu(0;Uu) = Uu and INDLu(1;Uu) = 1. In addition, INDLu(x;Uu) is increasing in Uu.
Since the function g(¢) is smooth, the indi®erence curve is smooth. A marginal increase in the
wage o®er by the deviating ¯rm can only attract a marginal increase in the expected number of
applicants. Workers do not increase the probability of application in a discrete fashion to respond
to a marginally higher wage; If they did, each applicant would have almost zero probability of
getting that wage. Similarly, a low-technology ¯rm does not expect to lose all the applicants by
cutting the wage o®er marginally.














The solution to this problem can be depicted geometrically. To do so, express the ¯rm's iso-pro¯t
curve for any ¼ 2 (0;y) as
wd
L = ISPL(xd
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        L
w=ISPL(x;pi2)
    w=ISPL(x;pi1) direction of increasing
expected profit
   0            x
Figure 2:
The iso-pro¯t function ISPL(x;¼) is strictly increasing in x, implying that a ¯rm is compensated
for a higher wage o®er by a higher chance of a match. Also, ISPL(x;¼) is concave in x, with
ISPL(0;¼) = ¡1 and ISPL(1;¼) = y ¡ ¼. In addition, ISPL(x;¼) is decreasing in ¼. With
the properties of the iso-pro¯t curve and the indi®erence curve, the problem (PL) has a unique
solution depicted by point L in Figure 2.
A deviation by a single high-technology ¯rm can be examined similarly. Let a single high-
technology ¯rm deviate from wH = (ws;wHu) to wd
H = (wd
s;wd
Hu), while all other ¯rms continue
to announce the same wages as before. Number the deviator as the ¯rst high-technology ¯rm so
the new wages are Wd = (wd
H;wH;¢¢¢;wL;¢¢¢). Observing the new wages, each skilled worker
revises the strategy to Xd
s = (xd
s;xs;¢¢¢) and each unskilled worker revises the strategy to Xd
u =
(xd
Hu;xHu;¢¢¢;xLu;¢¢¢). Again, when there are in¯nitely many workers and ¯rms, the expected
13numbers of skilled and unskilled applicants for a non-deviator do not change.

















These indi®erence curves have properties similar to those of INDLu. For given (Us;Uu), a




















The ¯rst term of the expected pro¯t is from hiring a skilled worker and the second term is from
hiring an unskilled worker when no skilled worker applies to the ¯rm.
It is useful to solve (PH) in two steps. First, for ¯xed xd













This problem is similar to (PL) and the \iso-pro¯t" curve has the same functionalform ISPL(x;¼)
as in (15). Given (xd
s;Uu), the unique solution for (PHu) is depicted by point H in Figure 2.
Let the maximized value for ¼Hu from (PHu) be ¼Hu(xd
s;Uu), which depends on xd
s because xd
s
a®ects an unskilled applicant's chance of getting the high-technology job through (16).
In the second step, wd














For any pro¯t level ¼, the ¯rm's iso-pro¯t curve is
wd
s = ISPH(xd







With suitable restrictions, ISPH(x;¼;Uu) is strictly increasing and concave in x. The solution
to (PHs) is depicted in Figure 3 by point S, together with the solution to (PHu) (point H).
For the posted wages W and workers' strategies (Xs;Xu) to form an equilibrium, the devia-
tions cannot be pro¯table and so wL must solve (PL), wHu must solve (PHu) and ws must solve
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w=INDs(x;Us)
                 H
 w=ISPL(x;pi1) direction of
increasing
expected profit
   0        x
Figure 3:
153.3 Equilibrium: De¯nition, Existence and Uniqueness
In equilibrium the queue lengths (xs;xHu;xLu) must satisfy the adding-up restrictions, (11) and
(12), which can be used to solve for workers' expected wages (Us;Uu). Also, (n;H) must be
consistent with ¯rms' entry, yielding zero net-pro¯t in the two industries. That is,
¼L = KL, ¼H = KH: (19)
A (mixed strategy) limit equilibrium consists of the worker/¯rm ratio n, the fraction of high-
technology ¯rms H, workers' expected utilities (Us;Uu), posted wages W = (wH;¢¢¢;wL;¢¢¢),
workers' strategies Xs = (xs;¢¢¢) and Xu = (xHu;¢¢¢;xLu;¢¢¢) such that
(i) (3) is satis¯ed and Us > Uu;
(ii) A skilled worker is indi®erent between high-technology ¯rms, i.e., xs 2 (0;1); an unskilled
worker is indi®erent between all ¯rms, i.e., xLu;xHu 2 (0;1);
(iii) Given (Us;Uu) and other ¯rms' wages, each ¯rm's wL solves (PL) and wH solves (PH);
(iv) Us and Uu, entering through (xs;xHu;xLu), satisfy (11) and (12);
(v) The numbers (n;H) are such that ¯rms earn zero net pro¯t.
An equilibrium can be found by ¯rst solving the queue lengths and wages for given (n;H) and
then invoking the zero net-pro¯t conditions. Imposing the equilibrium requirements xd
Lu = xLu,
xd
Hu = xHu and xd























The wages come directly from workers' indi®erence curves. The queue lengths can be interpreted
as follows. Consider ¯rst an unskilled worker who applies to a low-technology ¯rm. The wage
share of output determined by the ¯rm is xLu=(exLu¡1), which is intuitively a decreasing function
16of the queue length of such workers. Since the worker gets the jobwith probability (1¡e¡xLu)=xLu,
the worker's expected wage is e¡xLuy. Equating this to Uu yields the expression for xLu in (20).
If the unskilled worker applies to a high-technology ¯rm, he faces a wage share xHu=(exHu ¡ 1)
and a probability of getting the job e¡xs(1 ¡ e¡xHu)=xHu. The expected wage is e¡(xs+xHu)y
which must be the same as that from applying to a low-technology ¯rm, yielding xs+xHu = xLu.
Similarly, a skilled worker would be rewarded an expected wage e¡xsµy if he did not crowd out
unskilled workers. But a skilled worker does crowd out unskilled workers and such crowding-out
matters to the ¯rm when the ¯rm does not get any skilled applicant. The expected loss in pro¯t
from such crowding-out is ye¡xs(1 ¡ e¡xHu), where e¡xs(1 ¡ e¡xHu) is the probability that the
¯rm receives some unskilled applicants but no skilled applicant. Taking this crowding-out e®ect
into account, the ¯rm rewards a skilled worker with an expected wage e¡xsµy¡e¡xsy(1¡e¡xHu).
Equating this to Us and substituting xHu yields the condition for xs in (22).




; xHu = n¡
ns
H
; xLu = n; (23)
Uu = ye¡n; Us = y
h
e¡n + (µ ¡ 1)e¡ns=H
i
: (24)
Finally, substituting (23) and (24) into the zero net-pro¯t conditions yields:














Denote the left-hand side of (25) by B(n) and its inverse function by B¡1(¢). Then the left-hand
side of (26) is B(ns=H). Denote
¹ s ´
B¡1((KH ¡ KL)=[(µ ¡1)y])
B¡1(KL=y)
: (27)
The following proposition is shown in Appendix C:
Proposition 3 With Assumption 1 and s < ¹ s, the limit equilibrium de¯ned above exists and is
unique. In particular, (3) is satis¯ed and Us > Uu.
17The condition s < ¹ s ensures H < 1. Assumption 1 delivers H > s, which is necessary
and su±cient for both xs and xHu to be strictly positive (and ¯nite). The same assumption
delivers (3) and so high-technology ¯rms prefer hiring skilled workers. The reason why a high µ
is necessary for xHu > 0 is as follows. Only when the productivity advantage of skilled workers is
high enough are there enough high-technology ¯rms entering the industry to compete for skilled
workers. In this case high-technology ¯rms fail to ¯nd a skilled worker with a high probability,
making it attractive for unskilled workers to apply to those ¯rms.7
4 Properties of the Limit Equilibrium
4.1 Wage Di®erentials
The equilibrium possesses positive wage di®erentials both between skills and within unskilled
workers. By construction, there is no wage di®erential between skilled workers. Let us start with
the wage di®erential within unskilled workers, which is summarized in the following proposition
(see Appendix D for a proof):
Proposition 4 wHu > wL. That is, an unskilled worker in a high-technology ¯rm is paid a
higher wage than an identical unskilled worker in a low-technology ¯rm.
The explanation for the wage di®erential within unskilled workers is simple. An unskilled
worker who applies to a high-technology job has a lower probability to get the job than does
an identical unskilled worker who applies to a low-technology job. To compensate for this lower
probability, high-technology ¯rms must o®er a higher wage to unskilled applicants than do low-
technology ¯rms. Figure 2 illustrates this wage di®erential. The indi®erence curve for an unskilled
worker applying to a high-technology ¯rm, INDHu(xHu;Uu;xs), lies above the indi®erence curve
for an unskilled worker applying to a low-technology ¯rm, INDLu(xLu;Uu). Since the iso-pro¯t
curves in the two cases have the identical functional form, point H lies northwest of point L,
yielding wHu > wL.
7In the more general environment (see Section 6.2) where an unskilled worker generates a higher value of product
in a high-technology ¯rm than in a low-technology ¯rm, it is possible that xHu > 0 even when H < s.
18The presence of skill-biased technology is important for the wage inequality: If µ = 1 then
wHu = wL. Although this result in general is linked to the literature on skill-biased technological
progress (e.g., Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997), the fundamental reason for the wage di®er-
ence wHu ¡ wL is di®erent here. Unskilled workers in the high-technology industry earn higher
wages than their peers in the low-technology industry not because they have additional match-
speci¯c productivity with the ¯rms, nor because they are complementary with skilled workers in
production, but because they bear a higher risk of failing to get the job.
The wage di®erential within unskilled workers is also a wage di®erential between industries.
The existence of an inter-industry wage di®erential is consistent with the evidence in Katz and
Summers (1989) but, in contrast to their interpretation of such a di®erential as an industry rent,
here unskilled workers are indi®erent between the two industries ex ante.
It should also be emphasized that, despite the higher wage which an unskilled worker gets
in the high-technology industry than in the low-technology industry, the worker does not face
a longer queue in the high-technology industry but rather a less favorable queue. Although the
queue lengths of workers for a ¯rm in the two industries are both equal to n, an unskilled worker
faces a queue in the high-technology industry that has more skilled workers. Thus, failing to
observe a positive correlation between the wage di®erential and the queue length di®erential does
not necessarily imply that workers do not make the trade-o® between the wage and the associated
probability: To make this inference one must also ensure that the applicants queueing for di®erent
wages have the same quality. Therefore, the paradoxical ¯nding in Holzer et al. (1991), that jobs
paying more than the minimum wage attract fewer applicants than do minimum wage jobs, can
be consistent with workers' trade-o® between the wage and the associated probability if jobs
paying more than the minimum wage attracts better applicants.
Now let us turn to wage di®erentials between skills. The result Us > Uu in Proposition
3 states that a skilled worker obtains a higher expected wage from the market than does an
unskilled worker. An important reason for this positive di®erence is that skilled workers have a
19better chance of getting a job. To generate a positive skill premium in terms of actual wages, µ
must be large enough, as stated below (see Appendix D for a proof):
Proposition 5 Skilled workers obtain higher expected wages than unskilled workers, i.e., Us >
Uu. In the high-technology industry, skilled workers obtain higher actual wages, i.e., ws > wHu,
if and only if µ > maxfµ1;KH=KLg, where µ1 is de¯ned in Appendix D.
Measures of wage di®erentials used in practice take into account of both the relative wage
and the employment distribution. To de¯ne wage di®erentials, let Ns be the number of employed
skilled workers, NHu be the number of unskilled workers employedin the high-technology industry,
and NL be the number of unskilled workers employed in the low-technology industry. Then,8
Ns = MH(1 ¡ e¡ns=H); NHu = MH(e¡ns=H ¡ e¡n); NL = M(1 ¡H)(1 ¡e¡n):








Denote RB as the log relative average wage between skilled and unskilled workers and RE as
the log relative expected wage between skilled and unskilled workers. Denote RU as the log
relative wage within unskilled workers between the two industries and RH as the log relative






















Wage di®erentials are de¯ned as standard deviations in log wages of the corresponding group
of employed workers. Let DU be the wage di®erential within unskilled workers, DH be the
between-skill wage di®erential in the high-technology industry, DB be the between-skill wage
di®erential in terms of average log wages of the two types of workers, and DT be the overall wage
di®erential. DU is a measure of within-skill di®erential, while DH and DB are between-skill wage
8For example, in the calculation of Ns, MH is the number of high-technology ¯rms and (1 ¡ e
¡ns=H) is the
probability with which each high-technology ¯rm successfully hires a skilled worker.
20di®erentials. DH is a narrower measure of skill premium than DB since it is a within-industry














as(1 ¡as)(RH)2 +2as(1 ¡H)RH ¢RU + H(1 ¡H)(RU)2
i1=2
; (31)
where as = Ns=(Ns +NHu +NL). All wage di®erentials are positive.
4.2 Matching Rates and Unemployment Rates
The two types of workers also experience di®erent matching rates and unemployment rates. Let














1 ¡ e¡n ¡H(1 ¡ e¡ns=H)
n(1¡ s)
: (33)
The following proposition can be shown directly:
Proposition 6 Skilled workers have a higher matching rate than unskilled workers, i.e., ®s > ®u,
and a lower unemployment rate.
Since skilled workers and unskilled workers have di®erent matching rates, they face di®erent
matching functions. Although skilled workers' matching rate is a nice decreasing function of the
ratio of the number of skilled workers to the number of high-technology ¯rms (ns=H), unskilled
workers' matching rate depends on the skill composition s, the ¯rm composition H and the overall
worker/¯rm ratio n in a rather complicated fashion. The endogeneity of the matching functions
contrasts with the exogenous nature of the aggregate matching function in the search theory of
unemployment (e.g., Mortensen, 1982, and Pissarides, 1990). Also, the endogenous matching
functions generate a higher unemployment rate for unskilled workers than for skilled workers,
which can improve the match between the search theory of unemployment and the data.
21Aggregate matching rates depend only on the overall worker/¯rm ratio and hence exhibit
constant returns-to-scale. For workers, the aggregate matching rate is:




On the ¯rms' side, since xs+xHu = xLu = n, a ¯rm gets the same expected number of applicants,
regardless of which industry the ¯rm is in, and so the matching rate is 1 ¡e¡n for all ¯rms.
5 Equilibrium Responses to Productivity Shocks
5.1 A Skill-Biased Productivity Increase
Consider an increase in the skill-biased productivity µ. The e®ects are summarizedin the following
proposition, whose proof is straightforward and omitted:


































Let me explain these e®ects one at a time. The skill-biased technological progress increases
the pro¯t of high-technology ¯rms and induces ¯rms to enter the high-technology industry. (26)
implies that the fraction of high-technology ¯rms increases, but (25) implies that the overall
worker/¯rm ratio is unchanged. Thus, the total number of ¯rms is unchanged and the increase
in the number of high-technology ¯rms is matched one for one by the decrease in the number
of low-technology ¯rms. The skill-biased technological progress stimulates the high-technology
industry at the expense of the low-technology industry.
Since there are more high-technology ¯rms, each attracts a smaller expected number of skilled
applicants (xs) and so the matching rate for skilled workers, ®s, increases. Also, the relative
expansion of the high-technology industry increases the probability, e¡xsg(n ¡ xs), with which
unskilled workers get jobs there. Thus, unskilled workers increase the probability of applying to
high-technology ¯rms and reduce the probability of applying to low-technology ¯rms. This switch
22in the application probability has two implications on unskilled workers' matching rate. First,
the reduction in the application probability to low-technology ¯rms matches the reduction in the
number of low-technology ¯rms and so the queue length of applicants for each low-technology
¯rm is unchanged. So is each applicant's probability of getting a low-technology job. Second, the
average matching rate for unskilled workers, ®u, falls. This is because getting a job in the high-
technology industry is less likely for unskilled workers than in the low-technology industry; when
they switch in the application probability from the low-technology industry to the high-technology
industry, their average matching rate falls.
The overall matching rate in the economy is unchanged by the increase in µ, since the overall
worker/¯rm ratio is unchanged. The increased matching rate for skilled workers is matched one
for one by the fall in unskilled workers' matching rate. The queue length of workers for each ¯rm
does not change either, since it equals n in equilibrium.
The responses of wages are tied to those of the matching rates. First, since the queue length
of workers for each low-technology ¯rm does not change, as argued above, an applicant's trade-o®
between the wage and the probability of getting the low-technology job is the same as before.
Since workers' productivity in the low-technology industry is also the same as before, the wage
rate must be the same as before, i.e., wL does not change. Since neither the wage nor the
probability of getting a job in the low-technology industry changes, the expected wage for an
unskilled worker, Uu, does not change (see (24)). The solution to a low-technology ¯rm's problem
continues to be depicted by point L in Figure 2.
Second, the wage posted by a high-technology ¯rm for unskilled workers, wHu, falls. This
is because the increased number of high-technology jobs makes it easier for an unskilled worker
to obtain a high-technology job than before. High-technology ¯rms can reduce the wage o®ered
to unskilled workers and yet keep them indi®erent between the two types of jobs. In Figure
2, a fall in xs shifts southeast the indi®erence curve of an unskilled worker who applies to a
high-technology job, inducing wHu to fall.
23Third, the wage posted by high-technology ¯rms for skilled workers, ws, increases. So does
the expected wage for skilled workers, Us. The expected wage increases by more than does the
actual wage because the probability for a skilled worker to get a job also increases when the
number of high-technology ¯rms increases.
The relative wage between skills in the high-technology industry, ws=wHu, increases. Em-
ployment in the high-technology industry increases. So does the fraction of unskilled workers
employed there, NHu=(Ns+NHu), as more unskilled workers apply to that industry. Thus, more
workers in that industry are earning low wages, adding to the lower tail of the wage distribution
in the high-technology industry. This change in the skill distribution re-enforces the increase in
the relative wage ws=wHu in generating a large increase in the between-skill wage di®erential in
the high-technology industry, DH.
The wage di®erential within unskilled workers, DU, responds to µ ambiguously. On the one
hand, the relative wage within unskilled workers, wHu=wL, falls, which reduces the within-skill
wage di®erential. On the other hand, there are more unskilled workers who are now employed
in the high-technology industry, which adds to the upper tail of the wage distribution among
unskilled workers and increases the corresponding wage di®erential. Analytically it is not clear
whether the response of the relative wage or that of the wage distribution dominates.
To illustrate the wage di®erentials, let us consider a realistic example. Normalize y = 10. To
circumvent the di±culty of precisely de¯ning skill categories, I choose s = 0:2, match RU with
the 50-10 percentile log relative wage and match RH with the 90-50 percentile log relative wage.
Sample values (U.S. data) for these log relative wages can be found in Juhn et al. (1993, Table 2).
The 50-10 percentile log relative wage is 0:50 in 1964 and 0:64 in 1988, with an average value 0:57.
The 90-50 percentile log relative wage is 0:44 in 1964 and 0:54 in 1988, with an average value
0:49. According to the decomposition in Juhn et al. (1993, Table 4), about a third of the changes
in the 50-10 percentile log relative wage is due to skill changes, which the measure RU does not
capture. Thus, I match RU with the remainder, i.e., RU = 0:57£2=3 ¼ 0:38. Also, about 42% of
24the changes in the 90¡50 percentile log relative wage is due to factors other than skills. Since RH
in the current model is generated solely by the skill di®erence, I set RH = 0:49 £ 58% ¼ 0:285.
Finally, the overall wage/output ratio is set to the realistic value 0:64. The procedure yields:
KL = 2:15, KH = 3:51, and µ = 1:912, which satisfy Assumption 1.
Now I increase µ from its base value 1:912 to 2:062, with a step 0:015, and compute the
equilibrium for each step. Figures 4 and5 depict the responses of wage di®erentials andlog relative
wages. First, con¯rming the above analysis, the skill-biased productivity progress increases log
relative wages between skills, RH and RB, and widens between-skill wage di®erentials, DH and
DB. Second, the wage di®erential within unskilled workers, DU, increases, despite the fall in
RU. This indicates that the shift in employment of unskilled workers from the low-technology
industry to the high-technology industry generates a dominating e®ect on the wage di®erential
within unskilled workers. Third, between-skill wage di®erentials increase by much more than does
the within-skill wage di®erential. Finally, the overall wage di®erential increases.
5.2 A General Productivity Increase
Increasing the general productivity y has the following e®ects (see Appendix E for a proof):


































The general productivity increase makes ¯rms' entry pro¯table in both industries, generating
a lower overall worker/¯rm ratio, n, and a lower ratio of skilled workers to high-technology ¯rms,
ns=H. Consequently, the matching rates for skilled and unskilled workers both rise, resulting in
an increase in the overall matching rate for each worker. Since the demand for labor is higher and
workers' productivity is higher now than before, expected wages for skilled and unskilled workers
both rise. As indicated by (24), increases in Uu and Us come from both the increase in y and the
reductions in queue lengths (n;ns=H).
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27The expansionis notuniform across industries. Proposition 8 indicates that the low-technology
industry expands by more than does the high-technology industry and so the fraction of high-
technology ¯rms in the economy falls. Intuitively, with a lower ¯xed cost of entry, a low-technology
¯rm's net pro¯t responds by more proportionally to a multiplicative increase in the general pro-
ductivity than does a high-technology ¯rm's net pro¯t, which must be eliminated in equilibrium
by a relatively larger entry of new ¯rms into the low-technology industry. Technically, B0(x)=B(x)
is a decreasing function of x (see (25)). Since xs < xLu (= n), a larger decrease in xLu is required
than in xs to eliminate the increase in pro¯t brought about by the increase in y. That is, n
decreases by more than ns=H does, implying a decrease in H.
Because of the non-uniform expansion across industries, the matching rate for unskilled work-
ers increases by more than does the matching rate for skilled workers. The expected wage for
unskilled workers, Uu, increases by more than does the expected wage for skilled workers, Us.
The wages, (ws;wHu;wL), all rise when y increases, but not in the same proportion. First, the
relative wage within unskilled workers, wHu=wL, falls. A simple explanation is that the relatively
large increase in the revenue of a low-technology ¯rm is shared by a relatively large increase in the
corresponding wage. Speci¯cally, the relatively large expansion of the low-technology industry
increases the industry's relative demand for workers and, to attract applicants, low-technology
¯rms increase wage o®ers by a large proportion. This higher wage induces the queue length
of unskilled workers for each low-technology ¯rm, n, to increase relative to that for each high-
technology ¯rm, n¡ns=H, although both decrease in response to the increase in y. The response
of the relative wage within unskilled workers can be seen from Figure 2: An increase in Uu shifts
both INDLu and INDHu up northwest, but the shift in INDHu is smaller because xs is smaller,
reducing the relative wage wHu=wL.
Second, the relative wage ws=wHu increases. Again, this is because unskilled workers switch
in the application probability from the high-technology industry to the low-technology industry.
This switch reduces the expected number of unskilled applicants for each high-technology ¯rm,
28n¡ns=H, relative to the expected number of skilled applicants for such a ¯rm, ns=H. Conditional
on applying to the high-technology industry, an unskilled worker's chance of getting a job increases
by more than a skilled worker's chance does. To o®set this relative change in the chance of getting
a job, a skilled worker's wage must increase relative to an unskilled worker's in the high-technology
industry. It is worthwhile emphasizing that the response of ws=wHu is opposite to that of wHu=wL
and so the overall between-skill relative wage, RB, may either increase or decrease.
As unskilled workers switch in the application probability from the high-technology industry
to the low-technology industry, the upper tail of the wage distribution within unskilled workers
becomes thinner, which reinforces the fall in the relative wage wHu=wL to narrow the wage
di®erential within unskilled workers, DU. The same shift in employment reduces the lower tail of
the wage distribution in the high-technology industry, which mitigates the increase in the relative
wage between skills. The response of the between-skill wage di®erential in the high-technology
industry, DH, is ambiguous analytically. So are the responses of the overall between-skill wage
di®erential, DB, and the overall wage di®erential among all workers, DT.
Let us consider the numerical example in the last subsection. Fix µ at the initial value,
increase y from its base value 10 to 12:5, with a step 0:25, and compute the equilibrium for
each step. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the responses of wage di®erentials and log relative wages.
First, as analyzed above, the log relative wage RU and the wage di®erential DU within unskilled
workers both fall. Second, the log relative wage in the high-technology industry RH and the
corresponding wage di®erential DH increase, indicating that the rise in the log relative wage RH
outweighs the negative e®ect on DH of the change in the skill distribution in this industry. Third,
the overall log relative wage between skills RB and the corresponding wage di®erential DB both
fall, but the magnitudes are very small. Finally, the overall wage di®erential DT falls slightly.
5.3 Discussion
The above results are useful for explaining the empirical facts listed in the introduction. First,
Juhn et al. (1993) have found that both the within-skill and between-skill wage di®erentials
290.35
0.05
DU y ( )
DH y ( )
DB y ( )
DT y ( )
yH y0 y











































RU y ( )
RH y ( )
RB y ( )
RE y ( )
yH y0 y




























31have been rising during 1980s, with the skill premium rising much faster than the within-skill
wage di®erential (see Figure 1). The current model shows that both the simultaneous increase
and the relative magnitude of changes in the two wage di®erentials can be generated by skill-
biased technological progress (see Figure 4). The skill-biased technological progress causes the
within-group wage di®erential among unskilled workers to rise because it induces an expansion of
the high-technology industry relative to the low-technology industry and shifts unskilled workers
from the low-technology to the high-technology industry. In contrast, a general productivity shock
generates an expansion of the low-technology industry relative to the high-technology industry
and causes the between-skill and within-skill wage di®erentials to move in opposite directions.
Second, the within-skill wage di®erential was rising while the skill premium was falling in
the 1970s, with the overall wage di®erential rising slowly (Juhn et al., 1993). These opposite
movements between the skill premium and the within-skill di®erential are in sharp contrast with
the pattern in the 1980s. The opposite movements in the two wage di®erentials are inconsistent
with skill-biased technological progress but consistent with a general productivity slowdown.
If a decrease in y in the model is re-interpreted as a slowdown in the growth of general labor
productivity, then Figure 6 shows that such a slowdown reduces the between-skill wage di®erential
and increases the within-skill wage di®erential, while the overall wage di®erential rises by a
magnitude much smaller than in the case of skill-biased technological progress.
Third, hours of work are procyclical and exhibit higher volatility for low wage earners than
for high wage earners (Rios-Rull, 1993). The current model, suitably extended into a stochastic
environment, is likely to deliver such a relative volatility if cycles are primarily driven by shocks to
the general productivity. To see this, recall that an increase in the general productivity increases
the matching rate for unskilled workers relative to skilled workers. Thus, low-wage earners' hours
of work increase by more in good times and also decrease by more in bad times than do high-wage
earners' hours of work.
The relatively more procyclical hours of work by unskilled workers are accompanied by
32counter-cyclical skill premium in average wages (Figure 7). That is, in good times skilled work-
ers' average wage rises by less than unskilled workers' and in bad times it also falls by less. This
counter-cyclical skill premium is realistic and has been found important for explaining the relative
volatility of hours of work by di®erent skill groups (Kydland, 1995). However, previous business
cycle models typically do not distinguish between industries and so it is not clear whether the
relative volatility of hours of work by di®erent skill groups also entails a counter-cyclical skill
premium within each industry. The current model provides a negative answer: When there is
an increase in the general productivity, the skill premium in the high-technology industry, DH,
increases rather than falls (Figure 6).
6 Extensions
The analysis so far has assumed a ¯xed fraction of skilled workers, a uniform productivity of un-
skilled workers across industries and a one-period setting. In this section I relax these restrictions
one at a time to check the sensitivity of the results. Relaxing the second assumption also allows
me to examine a sectorial shock.
6.1 The Supply of Skills
There can be many ways to endogenize the supply of skills. Since my purpose here is to check











; b > 0: (35)
This speci¯cation is intended to capture the following general features: (i) A higher relative
expected wage for skilled workers attracts more workers to upgrade their skills (S0 > 0); (ii) s > 0
only if Us > Uu; (iii) The attraction of a higher expected wage diminishes as the relative expected
wage increases (S00 < 0).
With this modi¯cation, I can examine the responses of the equilibrium to technological shocks
and, to economize on space, only a skill-biased productivity increase is discussed here. Setting
the initial value of s to the number 0:2 used in previous calculation yields b = 0:27. The responses
of wage di®erentials and log relative wages to an increase in µ are very similar to those in Figures
334 and 5 and hence are not depicted here. The only di®erence is a slight change in magnitudes.
In particular, the log relative wage within unskilled workers, RU, falls by less than when s is
¯xed. This is because the skill-biased technological progress increases the relative wage Us=Uu
and attracts more workers to become skilled. As the number of skilled workers increases, unskilled
workers who apply to high-technology ¯rms get jobs with a lower probability than in the case of
a ¯xed s. For unskilled workers to be now indi®erent between the jobs in the two industries, the
relative wage wHu=wL falls by less than before.
6.2 An Industry-Speci¯c Productivity/Demand Increase
Let me now relax the assumption on productivity but retain the assumption of a ¯xed s. Allowing
the products to be physically di®erent between the two industries, I re-interpret y as the value of
an unskilled worker's product in a low-technology ¯rm and re-interpret µy accordingly for a skilled
worker in a high-technology ¯rm. An unskilled worker's value of product in a high-technology
¯rm is denoted yµu, where µu can di®er from unity. Since a worker's value of product depends on
both the worker's productivity and the product demand, µu > 1 indicates either that an unskilled
worker is more productive in the high-technology industry than in the low-technology industry, or
that the demand for the high-technology industry's product is higher, or both. This modi¯cation
allows me to model an increase in the productivity/demand in the high-technology industry alone
as simultaneous increases in µ and µu in the same proportion. The restriction µ > µu is maintained
to guarantee that in the same (high-technology) industry a skilled worker's value of product is
higher than an unskilled worker's.
With this extension, one can re-formulate the ¯rms' maximization problems and derive the
equilibrium conditions. The exercise yields:
xLu = n ¡H lnµu; xs = ns=H; xHu = n¡
ns
H
+ (1 ¡ H)lnµu;
Uu = y(µu)He¡n; Us = y
h




















e¡n(µu)H lnµu +(µ ¡ µu)e¡ns=H
i
= (KH ¡ KL)=y:
The last two equations solve for the distribution variables (n;H).
Consider a productivity/demand increase in the high-technology industry alone and start
with the base values of parameters identi¯ed before, where µu = 1 and µ = 1:912. Increase µ
from its base value 1:912 to 2:062, with a step 0:015, and simultaneously increase µu in the same
proportion so as to maintain the relation µ = 1:912µu.
The responses of wage di®erentials to the sector-speci¯c productivity/demand increase are
very similar to the responses to a skill-biased productivity increase and hence are not depicted
here. The di®erences are in magnitudes. First, the wage di®erential within unskilled workers,
DU, increases by more than in the case of a skill-biased productivity increase. This is because
the value of product of unskilled workers in the high-technology industry increases relative to
that in the low-technology industry. Second, for the same reason, the average wage of unskilled
workers rises faster than in the case of a skill-biased productivity increase and so the overall skill
premium (DB) rises by less in the current case.
The response of the skill distribution is slightly di®erent in the current case. Recall that
when µu is ¯xed at one, the skill-biased productivity increase does not change the total number
of ¯rms. This is no longer true for a sectorial shock. The improvement in the value of product
for both skilled and unskilled workers in the high-technology industry makes a low-technology
¯rm much less pro¯table than a high-technology ¯rm. There are more unskilled workers who
move from the low-technology industry to the high-technology industry than in the case of a
skill-biased technological progress. As a result, the low-technology industry shrinks by more than
the high-technology industry expands and the total number of ¯rms decreases.
6.3 Dynamic Recruiting
Now let us return to the baseline model but extend the time horizon to in¯nity. Firms and
workers can try to get a match over time; matched workers and ¯rms experience some exogenous
35separation. Unskilled workers in the high-technology industry also experience endogenous sepa-
ration described below. As in the baseline model, there will be unemployed workers and vacant
jobs in the steady state. With realistic job separation rates, I have calculated the steady state of
this dynamic equilibrium, but only a descriptive summary is included here for the lack of space.
A high-technology ¯rm still wants to hire unskilled workers when it does not receive any skilled
applicant, because the ¯rm obtains a positive one-period gain by doing so rather than leaving the
job vacant. In the next period, the ¯rm can ¯re the unskilled worker and try to recruit again.
Despite this ¯ring possibility, unskilled workers apply to a high-technology job only when the
wages o®ered by high-technology ¯rms are su±ciently high. Thus, the relative wage between
industries among unskilled workers is larger than in the baseline case. Also, the log relative wage
between skilled and unskilled workers, RH, is larger here than in the one-period case because the
skill-biased productivity generates a bene¯t to the ¯rm over a much longer horizon.
The higher relative wages are accompanied by a decreased dispersion of skill employment in
the high-technology industry. Since unskilled workers in the high-technology industry experience
a 100% turnover rate, fewer of them are employed there in the steady state than in the one-
period setting. Thus, there are fewer unskilled workers earning high wages, although they earn
more now than in the one-period setting. These two opposite forces roughly cancel with each
other, leaving the wage di®erential within unskilled workers, DU, roughly the same as in the one-
period setting. Similarly, the wage di®erential between skills (DH) remains roughly the same
as in the one-period setting. In contrast, the in¯nite horizon signi¯cantly increases the average
between-skill di®erential DB and the overall wage di®erential DT.
7 Conclusion
I have constructed a wage-posting model that generates a positive skill premium and a positive
wage di®erential within unskilled workers. The skill premium arises here because of a skill-biased
technology. The wage di®erential within unskilled workers arises because the probability with
whichanunskilledworker gets a job di®ers inthe twoindustries. When an unskilled worker applies
36to a high-technology job, he competes with skilled workers and has a lower chance of getting the
job than if he applies to a low-technology job. To make unskilled workers indi®erent between the
two industries in terms of expected wages, the wage rate o®ered by high-technology ¯rms must
be higher. I have examined the responses of the wage di®erentials and matching rates to shocks
to the skill-biased productivity, the general productivity and the sectorial productivity/demand.
These responses provide useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill and
between-skill wage di®erentials in the 1970s and 1980s and for the relative volatility of hours of
work by di®erent skill groups of workers over business cycles.
The model has been kept simple to emphasize the wage di®erential within unskilled workers.
In particular, technologies and skills are such that there is no wage di®erential within skilled
workers. This wage di®erential can be captured by allowing the skill-biased productivity µ to have
di®erent realizations depending on matches, since skilled workers' productivity is more likely to
depend on speci¯c matches than does unskilled workers'. This extension, although complicating
the calculation considerably, would not change the qualitative results much.
The model has also abstracted from other important sources of wage di®erentials, such as the
employer size. In a separate paper (Shi, 1997) I have used a similar price/wage posting framework
to explain the size-wage di®erential among homogeneous workers. It remains to check how the
size-wage di®erential interacts with the wage di®erentials examined here.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
The following lemma is useful for the proof of Lemma 1:
Lemma 9 Let f be de¯ned in (4). For any probabilities (p1;p2) and positive integers (a1;a2),
denote Ck












































Thus, F(Á) is uniformly bounded between 0 and 1 for Á 2 [0;1]. So is the function ÁF(Á). When
computing the derivative d[ÁF(Á)]=dÁ, I can then switch the order of the derivative with the
summation in F. Carrying out the computation yields:
d
dÁ
[ÁF(Á)] = [1 ¡(1 ¡Á)p1]
a1[1 ¡(1 ¡Á)p2]
a2:




[1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)p1]
a1 [1 ¡(1 ¡Á)p2]
a2dÁ:
A straightforward transformation of the integration variable yields the desired result. QED
Now I show Lemma 1. First, I compute the selection probabilities q's. Consider ¯rst a skilled
worker, labeled worker A, who applies to a low-technology ¯rm. If there are k1 other skilled
applicants and k2 unskilled applicants for the same ¯rm, worker A is chosen by the ¯rm with
probability 1=(k1 + k2 + 1), since the low-technology ¯rm is indi®erent between all applicants.
Because there are (sN ¡1) other skilled workers, each applying to the same ¯rm with probability
pLs, and (1¡s)N unskilled workers, each applying to the same ¯rm with probability pLu, worker












J = J!=[I!(J¡I)!] for integers I and J (¸ I). The long expression following 1=(k1+k2+1)
is the probability that exactly k1 other skilled workers and k2 unskilled workers apply to the same
low-technology ¯rm to which worker A applies. Applying Lemma 9 yields qLs = f(pLs;pLu;sN ¡
1;(1¡ s)N), as in (5).
If worker A (skilled) applies to a high-technology ¯rm, his only competitors are other skilled
applicants, since high-technology ¯rms prefer skilled applicants to unskilled ones. Since there
are (sN ¡ 1) other skilled workers in the market and each applies with probability pHs to a
high-technology ¯rm, worker A will be chosen by the ¯rm with the following probability qHs =
f(pHs;0;sN ¡1;(1 ¡s)N).
Similarly, one can compute the selection probabilities for an unskilled worker and verify that
qLu is given by (7) and qHu is given by (8).
Now I show qHs > qHu. Since f(0;pHu;sN;(1¡s)N¡1) · 1, qHs > qHu if qHs > (1¡pHs)sN,
which is equivalent to the following inequality after the integral for qHs is computed:
1¡ (1¡ pHs)sN ¡ sNpHs(1 ¡pHs)sN > 0:
The left hand side of this inequality is a strictly increasing function of pHs for any pHs 2 (0;1]
and has a value zero when pHs = 0. Hence the inequality holds for all pHs 2 (0;1], yielding
qHs > qHu. Note that this inequality holds for arbitrarily large N and M as long as NpHs and
NpHu are bounded above zero.
Finally, I show wHs < wHu. When M;N ! 1, the probability with which a worker visits
each ¯rm is close to zero in a mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e., pHs, pHu, pLs, pLu ! 0. Then,
qLs ! qLu ! f(pLs;pLu;sN;(1 ¡ s)N) and so qLswL ! qLuwL. That is, in the limit skilled
and unskilled workers have the same expected payo® from applying to a low-technology ¯rm.
Since pHs 2 (0;1) requires qHswHs = qLswL, pHu 2 (0;1) requires qHuwHu = qLuwL, and
qLswL ! qLuwL, then pHs;pHu 2 (0;1) implies qHswHs ! qHuwHu. Since qHs > qHu in the
limit, as shown above, wHs < wHu. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. QED
B Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose, contrary to the lemma, that pHu = 0. Then pLu = 1=[(1 ¡ H)M]. Since pLs = 0,
pHs = 1=(HM). Let x1
s = limN;M!1 sNpHs and x1
u = limN;M!1(1 ¡ s)NpLu. With pLs =
pHu = 0, one can follow the calculation in Section 3 to show that in the limit N;M ! 1 the
expected pro¯t is µy[1¡(1+x1
s )e¡x1
s ] for a high-technology ¯rm and y[1¡(1+x1
u )e¡x1
u ] for a
low-technology ¯rm. In equilibrium these pro¯ts must be equal to the corresponding entry costs
and so Assumption 1 implies
µ[1¡ (1 + x1
s )e¡x1
s ]






Since the function 1 ¡(1 +x)e¡x is increasing in x, x1
s < x1
u and so s < H.
41Consider a single high-technology ¯rm that o®ers the same wage wHs as other ¯rms do to
skilled workers but a di®erent wage wd










and " is a su±ciently small positive number. Note that the ¯rst term in the square brackets is
the expected wage that the unskilled worker gets from applying to a low-technology ¯rm. An
unskilled worker who applies to wd
Hu when no other unskilled worker applies to wd
Hu gets the wage
with probability (1¡pHs)sN. Thus, he obtains a strictly higher expected wage from applying to
wd
Hu and so the wage wd
Hu attracts unskilled workers.
The wage wd
Hu is feasible to a high-technology ¯rm when N and M are su±ciently large.




s . Since x1
u > x1
s and " is su±ciently small, wd
Hu < y
for su±ciently large N and M. For given wHs < µy, let ^ w = wHs ¡ (µ ¡ 1)y and wdd
Hu =
maxfwd
Hu; ^ w + ±g, where ± is an arbitrarily small positive number. Then wdd
Hu is less than y,
satis¯es (3), and attracts unskilled workers. Thus, a high-technology ¯rm that o®ers wdd
Hu to
unskilled workers does not lose any skilled workers and yet attracts unskilled workers. As a
result, this ¯rm gets a higher expected pro¯t than other high-technology ¯rms, contradicting to
the equilibrium requirement. Therefore, pHu > 0. QED
C Proof of Proposition 3












The assumption s < ¹ s implies H < 1. Other variables can be solved by substituting the solutions
for (n;H) back into (20) { (24). The equilibrium requires xs, xHu and xLu all to lie in the interior
of (0;1). To verify these requirements, note ¯rst that xLu = n 2 (0;1). Second, µ > KH=KL is
necessary and su±cient for H > s, which in turn implies xs 2 (0;n) and xHu 2 (0;n).
The equilibrium also requires (3) to be satis¯ed and Us > Uu. With (24) it is easy to verify
Us > Uu. To verify (3), substitute the solutions for (ws;wHu) to rewrite the condition as














Since ea > 1+a and a > 1¡e¡a for any a > 0, then ens=H¡1 > ns=H andn¡ns=H > 1¡e¡n+ns=H
for H > s. The right-hand side of (36) is negative and so (36) is satis¯ed for H > s. QED
D Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5
For Proposition 4, compare wL in (20) with wHu in (21). Substituting xLu = n yields: wHu > wL
() (n ¡ xs)(1 ¡ e¡n) ¡ n(e¡xs ¡ e¡n) > 0. I show that this inequality holds in the feasible
42region xs 2 (0;n). For any arbitrary n > 0, temporarily denote the left-hand side of the above
inequality by LHS(xs). Since LHS(0) = LHS(n) = 0, LHS(xs) > 0 for all xs 2 (0;n) if LHS(¢)
is concave in the interval, but the concavity of LHS(¢) can be veri¯ed directly.








Since H > s under the assumption µ > KH=KL, the right-hand side of (37) is an increasing
function of s=H. Since the solution for s=H is a decreasing function of µ, there is a unique µ1
such that (37) holds with equality and that the strict inequality holds if and only if µ > µ1. The
value of µ1 is not necessarily greater than one. QED
E Proof of Proposition 8
In equilibrium, xs = ns=H. Temporarily drop the subscript s on x and denote ns=H by x. The
left-hand side of (25) is B(n) and the left-hand side of (26) is B(x). Di®erentiating the two



















Since B0 > 0, clearly dn=dy < 0, implying dxLu=dy < 0 and dUu=dy > 0. Also, dx=dy < 0,
implying d®s=dy > 0. To show dH=dy < 0, temporarily denote the numerator of the expression
for dH=dy by RHS(n) for any ¯xed x. Then dH=dy < 0 if and only if RHS(n) < 0. I show that
indeed RHS(n) < 0 in the feasible region n 2 (x;1). Since RHS(x) = 0, it su±ces to show
RHS0(n) < 0. Compute
RHS0(n) = (2 ¡n)[1 ¡(1 +x)e¡x] ¡ x2e¡x
< (2 ¡x)[1 ¡(1+ x)e¡x] ¡x2e¡x = 2 ¡x ¡(2+ x)e¡x:
The inequality follows from n > x and 1 ¡ (1 +x)e¡x > 0. The function 2 ¡x ¡(2 + x)e¡x has
a value zero when x = 0, a derivative ¡[1 ¡(1 +x)e¡x] < 0, and hence is negative for all x > 0.
Thus, RHS0(n) < 0 for all n > x.
The matching rate for an unskilled worker, ®u, can be shown to be a decreasing function
of (n;H). Since (n;H) both fall with y, d®u=dy > 0. The responses of wages stated in the
proposition can be veri¯ed directly. QED
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